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THE RAGING TELECOMMUNICATIONS WAR: THE
OFFENSIVE STEPS THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
SHOULD TAKE
Katherine L. Haennicke
t
"As liberalisation unfolds, the established players have to
wage war on two fronts: defending their customer bases
against raids by hostile neighbours while at the same time
mounting their own offensives behind enemy phone lines."
The connection of nations through means such as better transporta-
tion and more efficient communication has brought about the dawn of a
globalization of information. The United States holds a peculiar position
in the international telecommunications industry accounting for over
twenty percent of all international communications;' yet facing great
Associate, Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Priess; B.A., Knox College, cum laude,
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Law School, 2001.
1. Ed Shelton, Europe's Telcos Prepare for War, THE EUROPEAN, Aug. 3, 1998 at 1998
WL 8700168.
2. See In the Matter of Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities, 11
F.C.C. Record 3873, 1995 F.C.C. LEXIS 7684, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 459 (Nov. 28, 1995)
[hereinafter Market Entry]. For example, AT&T has announced that it will buy TCI in
order to gain cable access to American homes. Although the acquisition will cost roughly
$48 billion, it will give AT&T access to the $100 billion local telephone market. AT&T
Rings Up TC1 Deal (June 24, 1998). at http://money.cnn.com/1998/06/24/deals/att/index.htm.
Additionally, AT&T announced that it would enter into a joint venture with British
Telecommunications (BT) to create a free standing company that shall allow the companies
to offer universal service to their customers and take advantage of the $600 billion
telecommunications market. Id. Because American companies have such a large portion
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opposition to its participation from other foreign government regulations.
With the passage of the Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on
Trade in Services under the auspices of the World Trade Organization
4
(WTO), signatories attempted to cultivate international telecommunica-
tions5 thus giving Most Favored Nation6 (MFN) status to the participating
of the market, many foreign companies are fighting to vie for American favor. Id. BT had
originally tried to form an agreement with MCI but that deal fell through. Id. Now, BT
and AT&T are hoping to join together in the raging telecommunications war in order to
seize upon the growing opportunities the markets presents. Id.
3. See 141 CONG REC. S7492 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement by Sen. Byrd quoting a
December 1994 study by the Economic Strategy Institute). "A study by the Economic
Strategy Institute in December of 1994 found that 'while the U.S. has encouraged
competition in all telecommunication sectors except the local exchange, the overwhelming
majority of nations have discouraged competition and maintained a public monopoly that
has no incentive to become more efficient."' Id. Senator Byrd continued on, stating that
U.S. firms have competed against each other at a very high level thus allowing the most
advanced telecommunications to result. Id. The Economic Strategy Institute's study also
found that U.S. companies are hindered from entering the international front due to
foreign government regulations that prohibit or restrict U.S. participation. Id. These
international governmental regulations discriminate and overcharge against U.S. affiliates,
be it the firm or the consumer. Id. The study claims that U.S. firms stand to lose over $100
billion per year between 1992 and 2000 due to these foreign barriers. Id.
4. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
col. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter the WTO Agreement]. The World Trade
Organization came into existence with the Uruguay Round negotiations which culminated
in 1994. Id. The WTO was established on January 1, 1995 with a membership of 132
countries as of September 1997. Id. Unlike the GATT agreement, the new WTO is
recognized in law as an international organization. id. The WTO has amended and
incorporated the 50-year-old GATT agreement into its new structure. Id. Previously,
GAT only dealt with goods, whereas the WTO now covers intellectual property and
services as well. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. The WTO has equal status as the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank whereas the GATT agreement was a
provisional organization. See generally WTO Agreement. The WTO is a forum for
negotiating trade agreements, handling trade disputes, monitoring trade policies of
signatories, cooperates with other international organizations, and helps developing
countries. Id. The basic principles of the WTO are: non-discrimination, lessening of trade
restrictions, predictable policies, fostering of competition, and extra provisions for less
developed countries. Id. These principles are further enhanced by the goals of the WTO
agreements which aim at helping trade flow are freely as possible, continuously negotiating
the liberalization of trade, and setting up an equitable means of settling international
disputes. Id.
5. See Agreement on Telecommunications Services, Apr. 30, 1996, Fourth Protocol to
the General Agreement on Trade in Services World Trade Organization, 36 I.L.M. 354, 366
(1997) [hereinafter Fourth Protocol]. The Fourth Protocol was supposed to be effective on
January 1, 1998; however, this date was delayed due to the actions of a few of the countries.
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WTO members who want to compete in the member's communications
market.7  The United States drastically changed its regulation of its
telecommunications market with the 1997 Foreign Entry Order, a step
which was required by the WTO for those participating in the Fourth
Protocol.9 The European Union (EU) and the United States realized that
liberalization of the telecommunications industry will allow more
Id. The agreement was to be ratified by November 30, 1997, and then effective the first of
January the following year. Id. WTO members finally agreed to a February 5, 1998,
effective date but thirteen nations still had yet to ratify the agreement. Phillip L. Spector,
The World Trade Organization Agreement on Telecommunications, 32 THE INT'L LAW. 217
(1998). The WTO then decided that a postponement of the effective date would not be
beneficial, so the February 5th date was adhered to while the WTO sought pledges from
those countries who had not yet agreed to it. Id. The ratification deadline was extended
through the month of July for those thirteen countries. Id.
6. See GATT, supra note 4, art. 2. A country should neither discriminate between any
trading partners nor between domestic and foreign companies. Id. The first discrimination
between trading partners is called Most Favored Nation status (MFN). Id. If the United
States extended benefits to one trading partner, it would have to extend that benefit to all
other trading partners under this agreement. Id. No one country who is a fellow signatory
of the agreement, can be heralded as more important or more beneficial; thus, given better
status than another signatory-whether that country is weak or strong, poor or rich. Id.
There are some exceptions to this rule such as agreements between regional countries that
apply only to the goods within that region (NAFTA being an example). Id. Additionally, a
country can place barriers on goods from specific countries that are trading unfairly.
National treatment is also required by the agreement. Id. Once foreign goods have
entered the market, these goods are to reeeive the same treatment as local goods. Id. This
national treatment is only applied to the goods once they have entered the market. Id.
Customs duties are not a violation of the national treatment. Id.
7. See Fourth Protocol, supra note 5, 3. Those countries who wished to sign on to the
Protocol were thus bound by the tenets set forth in the agreement. Id. If a country chose
not to be bound by the agreement, then the MFN status would not be applicable, and those
party to the agreement could choose how to decide if that country could be allowed to
participate in WTO member markets. Id.
8. See Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications
Market, Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities, 12 F.C.C. Record
23,891, 1997 WL 735476 (FCC Nov. 25, 1997) [hereinafter In re Rules and Policies].
9. See John H. Harwood II et al., Competition in International Telecommunications
Services, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 874 (1997). Although not prevalent in the United States,
monopolies were of great concern to the negotiators of the Fourth Protocol. Id. To foster
competition and open up markets, each signatory has to implement legislation that would
allow others to enter the telecommunications market, be that company a domestic or
foreign-born entity. Id. The United States had to pass legislation that would no longer
require analyzing how open an applicant's market was, and instead allow an applicant from
a signatory nation to enjoy MFN status. Id.
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competition within its markets, and facilitate the rapid change needed in
the industry to promote growth and productivity.0
This article shall discuss the organization of the EU and the structure
with which the EU analyzes potential competition threats. After laying a
foundation, this article will look at the telecommunications market in the
EU and its current status. This article will then focus on the American
telecommunications market, and its analysis of competition within the
market to form the framework that will lead to an understanding of the
telecommunications industry. By analyzing how the international society
has dealt with past international telecommunication agreements, this paper
establishes that the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC)
Effective Competitive Opportunity Test (hereinafter ECO Test) is no
longer valued. Finally, this article suggests that the WTO should form a
committee to focus solely on such agreements. An international
committee, would open markets, lower costs for joint venture authoriza-
tion, and secure a place for competition to thrive.
I. THE BATrLE FIELD
The telecommunications field and information technology businesses
have been growing since their very inception, with each infiltrating the
lives of citizens across the globe. In 1998, the United States exported more
than $165 billion, of which $40.6 billion went to the European Union
collective. Canada ($25.9 billion), Mexico ($18.3 billion) and Japan ($15
billion) all bought from the United States. The information technology
industry is rather unique. The tools available, such as the web and
switching systems, allow access for anyone who has the ability to conceive
and implement new ideas to make a mark on the industry. Ventures are
not limited to the biggest battalion but rather, to any army in the war.
Steve Baloff, from Advanced Technology Ventures discussed the ability to
enter the information market, stating "[t]here are better and more
opportunities for smaller and newly formed companies in information
technology, especially software, because of the tools available."" Baloff
and other industry experts advise that entrepreneurs should be "careful
not to repeat common mistakes, such as rushing into a foreign market
before gaining enough experience at home, underestimating how much
10. See Constantine J. Zepos, Note, Liberalizing the "Sacred Cows": Telecommunications
and Postal Services in the EC, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 203 (1992). See also Catherine
Curran Butcher, Comment, Telecommunications in the European Union, 48 ADMIN. L.
REV. 451 (1996).
11. Christopher D. Lancette, Connected, ENTREPRENEUR, Sept. 1, 1999, at 8.
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money they'll need, and trying to develop products for industries they
don't really understand."' 2
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE BASIC TACTICS OF ITS STRUCTURE
The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, created the European Economic
Communities (originally known as the Common Market) with the goal of
establishing free movement of goods, people, and services. 3 In 1992, the
Maastricht Treaty14 sought to broaden the authority of the union of
Member States by amending the term used to refer to members. 5 Under
the Treaty of Rome, Articles 30-36 provide the foundation for the free
movement of goods among the Member States. 6 Article 85 forbids any
agreements, alliances, and other such arrangements that will, "as their
object or effect," prevent, restrict or distort competition.17 Article 86 does
not allow for any "[a]buse[s] by one or more undertaking of a dominant
12. Id.
13. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
14. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), 1 CM.L.R. 573
(1992) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. The Maastricht Treaty incorporates the original
Treaty of Rome. Id. Any reference to the Articles of the Treaty can be found in either the
original treaty, which established the European Economic Community (1957 Treaty of
Rome). or the Maastricht Treaty. Id. The Maastricht Treaty introduced the term European
Union. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. art. 30-36.
17. Id. art. 85.
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common mar-
ket: all agreements between undertakings, decision by associations of un-
dertakings and concerted parties which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular
those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or in-
vestment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trad-
ing parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or accord-
ing to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts. Id.
20011
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position.' 8  After denouncing this practice, the Article then lists many
examples, which the EU members can follow to judge the actions of
dominating corporations.'9 Government monopolies are allowed under
Article 90 but are subject to the Treaty's competition principles. °
Although several layers of differing representative bodies govern the
Treaty, the European Commission holds the administrative power of the
18. Id. art. 86.
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incom-
patible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between
Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets, or technical development to the preju-
dice or consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or accord-
ing to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts. Id.
This article applies to the analysis of dominant positions and whether a company or
companies will frustrate the goals of the common market. Id.
19. Id.
20. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1.4, art. 90. "In the case of public undertakings and
undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall
neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in the
Treaty, in particular to those rule provided for in Article 6 and Articles 85 to 94." Thus, the
Maastricht Treaty does not take away the ability to grant exclusive or special rights. Id.
Instead, each Member State is held accountable for the special grants. Id. If the rights
granted to the company violate the Treaty, then those rights are not valid and both the
Member State and the company can be fined. Id.
21. See generally Maastricht Treaty, supra note 14. The European Parliament is directly
elected from the citizens of Europe. Id. Other European Institutions include the Court of
Justice, which is the judicial overseer of the exercise of EU law. Id. The Court of Auditors
regulates the money that is spent by the Union and makes sure that all the budgets are in
accordance with the rules and regulations. Id. The Economic and Social Committee is an
advisor to the various branches. Id. They investigate various areas of the economic and
social activity in the Member States and do so at their own initiative or by a referral by the
Council, Commission, or the Parliament. Id. The Committee of the Regions is another
advisory establishment that helps deal with local cultures of the Member States and help
resolve the laws with the different cultures. See generally id. European Ombudsman is the
institution to which a European citizen (a person is a citizen of his country as well as a
[Vols. 8.2 & 9.1
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EU.22  The European Commission proposes legislation, investigates
violations of the EU law,2  oversees the provision regarding government
monopolies, and addresses directives to the Member States.24 The Council
of Ministers is at the top25 and adopts the proposed directives from the
26European Commission. The European Parliament can propose
amendments to the intended directives. 7 Once the Commission proposes
citizen of the European Union) applies to when the person feels that they are a victim of
abuse of authority by an EU institution or body. Id.
22. See id. art. 155.
In order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common market, the
Commission shall:
- ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the
institutions pursuant thereto are applied;
- formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with
this Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Commission considers it
necessary;
- have its own power of decision and participate in the shaping of meas-
ures taken by the Council and by the European Parliament in the man-
ner provided for in this Treaty;
- exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementa-
tion of the rules laid down by the latter. Id.
23. Id. Through special committees set up by the Commission or any of the advisory
committees, the Commission can investigate whether or not a member state has complied
with the Directives and Regulations set forth by the EU governing bodies. Id.
24. See id. art. 90(3). "The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of
this Article and shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to
Member States." Id. These directives, which are a basic form of legislation that is enacted
by the European Union, are binding on each Member State. Id. art. 5.
25. See id. arts. 145-50. The Council of Ministers is made up of one person from each
member state. Id. The Council coordinate national policies between the members in order
to resolve the differences between the different members and their institutions. Id. The
Council of Ministers makes administrative decisions that are based upon either a
unanimous vote or a qualified majority (a weighted vote). Id. The Council has the duty of
adopting or vetoing the proposed legislation from the European Commission. Id. The
Council is not obligated to pass all legislation that is handed to them by the Commission.
Id. Instead, the Council evaluates the proposal and decides for itself whether or not to
enact the proposed legislation. Id. arts. 145-50.
26. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 14, art. 169. The Commission does have limited
power to pass directives and regulations without consulting the Council first. Directives
intended to further the competition goals of the Union do not have to go before the
Council. Id. art. 85. The Commission can pass the necessary directives and regulations that
further duties specifically given to it through the treaty, such as those which foster
competition in the EU. Id.
27. See id. arts. 137-44. These articles set forth the general rules and guidelines for the
Parliament and the powers that they are provided. id. The articles set forth the number of
2001]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
a directive, the Council adopts it; it is then left to the Member States to
implement that directive," although the Member States have room for
their own literal expression of the directive.
29
The Directorates-General IV of the Commission (a division of the
Commission) is in charge of the competition law in the EU.3° When two
companies merge within the EU, the merger must be verified through the
European Commission, and more specifically this division provides the
Merger Task Force, which receives merger notifications. 31 The Director-
ates-General IV investigates actions and is allowed to find corporations
32
which violate the EU competition law.
representatives from each member state that shall be elected to the Parliament, how the
President should be elected, voting, and duties of the Parliament. Id.
28. See id. art. 169.
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill an
obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the
matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its ob-
servations. If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion
within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the
matter before the Court of Justice. Id.
29. See id. art. 5. The Member States do not have to accept the directive as written, word
for word, but they are required to accomplish the intentions of the directive. Id, It is not
that the Members are allowed to choose which directives they wish to follow, but instead
are allowed great room in the actual implementation. The directives are required but the
literal words are not obligatory, only the directive's objective is binding. The Commission
can take action against Member States who do not implement a directive. Marshall v.
Southampton Area Health Authority, 1986 E.C.R. 723, 728.
30. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 14, art. 90. The Commission has the authority to
investigate mergers and to apply the law as set forth in the treaty. Id. The article states
that the Commission "shall ensure the application of the provisions of this Article and shall,
where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to Member States." Id. See
generally RALPH H. FOLSON, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 66-68 (2d ed. 1995). Folsom explains
the general organization of the Commission, which has twelve Directorate Generals, which
are allocated a particular area of administrative, legislative, drafting, and enforcement
duties. Id.
31. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 14, art. 90. Although the Maastricht Treaty does
not set up the Merger Task Force, the articles give broad discretion to the Commission to
"ensure" application of the Treaty. Id. The Commission, in fuTtherance of application of
the articles, has set up the Task Force to ensure compliance. Id.
32. See id. Through fines and directives, the Commission can effectively challenge
mergers and joint ventures. Id. If the infringements of the competition policies are not
brought to an end, the Commission can authorize Member States to take measures
(determined by the Commission) to remedy the infringement. Id. art. 89.
[Vols. 8.2 & 9.1
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III. THE EUROPEAN UNION TELECOMMUNICATIONS WAR FRONT
The EU did not allow privatized telecommunication companies to
compete in the telecommunications market until the late '90s. The
companies were government-owned monopolies. In 1987, the European
Commission released a Green Paper33 that describes the need for more
competition in European telecommunications with the exception of the
basic voice telephony.34 The Green Paper study discovered the trend
33. See Towards a Dynamic European Economy: Green Paper on the Development of the
Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM (87) 290
[hereinafter Green Paper]. The Green Papers that are produced by the Commission are
intended to relay information, start debate, and initiate a discussion on possible legislation
for that particular area. Id. After a Green Paper sets forth its conclusions regarding the
discussions, investigations, and other information, a White Paper may be produced. Id. A
White Paper is a document that proposes legislation for the European Community. Id.
Once the Commission has proposed a form of legislation through a White Paper, the
Council can take it under advisement and vote to incorporate the information into
European law. Id. The White Paper should not be confused with a Directive. Id.
34. Id. Around the same time as the Green Paper, the European Commission had set up
a group of experts to look at information users and producers in order to decide their needs
and future desires. The European Commission, available at http://193.91.44.33/eudocs/en/
bangemann.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 1998). As a result, the Bangemann report was
released. Id. The main points of the report suggested ten applications: teleworking (the
ability to work at home through a PC and a telephone link); distance learning (the ability to
continue learning once out of school by not having to attend regular classes); networks for
universities and research centers (the ability for European universities and research centers
to access one another's libraries and databases); remote processing services for small
business (ability to be established with authorities, associations, suppliers, and customers so
that transactions can be quicker and easier. Large companies already do this but the report
realized that small businesses would greatly benefit from this as well); road traffic
management (driver information, routes, road pricing would all be accessible for European
Union citizens); air-traffic control (better communication between pilots and air-traffic
control centers by creating a single, trans-European air-traffic control system); health-care
networks (the ability to consult with specialists throughout the European Union, a larger
pool for transplant options, and the general ability for doctors, hospitals, rehabilitation
centers, and health insurance organizations to exchange varied information); electronic
tendering (the ability to tender for public contracts over an electronic process); Trans-
European public administration network (the ability to exchange tax and customs
information, statistics, social security information, and other such correspondence used in
the progression of the European Union); and City information highways (general abilities
over the network such as catalogs providing home delivery, home-banking, or studying a
language from home). Id. The key to the Bangemann report is that the system is not that
of the Internet. Id. Instead, it takes telecommunications one step further by calling for a
network that is linked through the television set and each European Union member state
will be connected to this network (thus calling into question whether or not it will only be
accessible for EU members and not other foreign states). Id.
2001]
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towards the privatization of telecommunications in order to promote
growth, advancement, and competition." The Green Paper examined how
the same government agency within the Member States owns the
telecommunication systems and equipment, set the prices, and granted
approval for the provision of the services." If the EU were to keep up in
the telecommunications race, according to the Green Paper, the industry
would have to allow for competition.17 In 1995, the Directorates-General
IV used its Article 90 power to issue Open Network Provision Directives
(ONP directives) relating to a variety of issues: prices and standards for3" 38
leased lines, requirements for voice telephony,39 and the requirement to
remove all restrictions in negotiations for interconnection agreements.
Two earlier directives have played an important part in limiting the
Member States' ability to grant or authorize monopolies in the telecom-
munications area. The first directive, The Terminal Equipment Directive,
35. Green Paper, supra note 33, at 10. The European Union analyzed the AT&T
divestiture of the "baby bells" and realized the impact this would have on U.S. competition.
Id. The divestiture would help spur new growth and competition in the long distance
market. Id. The EU wanted the liberalization of its markets and the elimination of state
monopolies to have a similar effect. Id.
36. Id. at 11. Since the same agency was in charge of regulating prices and providing
services, it did not have much incentive to change the services provided nor the cost to the
consumer. Id. Service remained poor, very little technological advance took place, and the
monopoly served its own interests. Id. Essentially, since no checks or balances existed to
help control the agency, that agency would do whatever it chose to do in order to serve it
own self interests. Id.
37. Id. at 68.
38. See Council Directive 92/44, 1992 O.J. (L 165) 24. This Directive expressly states that
if the leased line terminates outside of the European Union, then the Directive does not
apply. Id. If one of a networked lease line terminates outside of the European Union, then
this Directive does not apply to that line either. Id.
39. See Council Directive 95/62, 1995 O.J. (L 321) 6. This directive has been a source of
confusion however for it does not adequately define what the term "special network
access" refers to despite the fact that the Directive draws a distinction between
requirements of interconnection and a "special network access." Id. It would appear the
term refers to those who are attempting to get into the market as new service providers
however the European Commission has not made the definition clear. Id. This directive
declares that a potential service provider, who requests public network facilities access from
a dominant operator, should be supplied that access in accordance to cost orientation. Id.
If the telecommunications providers, who have network facilities, are requesting access,
then this should be deemed a commercial negotiation and is considered interconnection.
Id.
40. See Council Directive 97/33, 1997 O.J. (L 199) 32. This Directive requires that major
telecommunication companies who have a significant market share, or any operator with a
twenty-five percent market share in a geographic area meet any and all reasonable requests
for interconnection. Id.
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requires that members establish free competition for telecommunications
equipment; telecommunication administrators are not allowed to regulate
and commercially distribute the equipment.4 ' This directive went a long
way to accomplishing the Green Paper's goal of reducing the number of
exclusive rights that have been granted in Member States. In 1988, there
were 35 companies that had such rights and by the end of 1991, only Italy
still had granted exclusive rights in this field.42 The second directive, The
Telecommunications Services Directive,43 defines each member state's
limit in granting exclusive rights as well as limits the extent to which the
members may require special licensing conditions within its borders in
order to operate."
IV. MAKING SURE THERE IS MORE THAN ONE ARMY TO COMPETE IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION
Under an Article 86 analysis, the European Commission will look at a
merger to see if the undertaking achieves a dominant position and if the
undertaking abuses that dominant position.4 ' A dominant position is that
of "economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to
prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by
affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of
its competitors, its customers and ... consumers." 46 The dominance must
occur in a relevant market, relevant market being defined from the
41. Commission Directive 88/301/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 131) 73. Any previous owners of
exclusive or special rights to import, sell, and lease terminal equipment, any previous
owners of the exclusive or special right to market certain services, and any previous owners
of exclusive or special rights to make connections to the public network and/or maintain
terminal equipment are no longer owners of such right and each member state must abolish
such rights. Id.
42. See Zepos, supra note 10, at 211. See also Butcher, supra note 10.
43. See Commission Directive 90/388/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 192) 10. This Directive focuses
on the competition in markets within each member state. Id. The principal goal was to
grant private interests the right to compete with the national operators in the provision of
non-voice services. Id. The operator's were still allowed to keep their exclusive rights to
provide voice services for this was the foundation and infrastructure of the Member States.
Id. Basically, the Commission allowed the exclusive rights to stand with regard to voice
services within a member state but any other telecommunication service, telex, cable, etc.,
was to be open to more competition and could not be given exclusive or special rights in the
Member States. Id.
44. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, BUSINESS GUIDE TO TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS LIBERALISATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 5, 6-9 (1992).
45. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 14, art. 86.
46. Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461,520.
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viewpoint of both the service or product and its geographical context.47
This test looks at the market in which the particular product or service can
be regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, with
another product or service, based on the characteristics, price, and
48intended use of the product or service. Article 86 prohibits the abuse of a
"dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of
it."' 49 A substantial part of the market must be determined by looking at
the "pattern and volume of the production and consumption of the said
product as well as the habits and economic opportunities of vendors and
purchasers."" In determining dominance, the European Commission will
look at three factors: the actual market share, the market data on the
• • • 51
coverage of the network, and the control of essential facilities.
V. THE UNITED STATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS WAR FRONT
The United States has also been trying to improve potential markets
and competition for its own corporations. Before the passage of the 1996
Telecommunications Act, the FCC established a test by which it will begin
reviewing applications of those seeking to enter the American Telecom-
munications market.52 The FCC believed that this new ECO Test would
achieve three goals. The first goal was "to promote effective competition
in the U.S. telecommunications services markets.,1 3 The second goal was
47. Case 247/86, Societe Alsacienne et Lorraine de Telecommunications et d'Electronique
Alsatel v. SA Novasam, 1988 E.C.R. 5987. Thus, the relevant market for a computer chip
would not include the soft drink market or the clothing industry. Id. The geographical
context could be important as well. Id. If the anti-competitive behavior is exhibited in a
Member State, the accused company has a dominant position in the Member State and the
market is generally focused in that particular Member State, then the geographic context
could be solely that Member State rather than expanding to include the whole European
Union. Id.
48. Communication from the Commission on the Application of the Competition Rules to
Access Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector-Framework, Relevant Markets,
and Principles, 1997 O.J. (C 76) 9 [hereinafter Communication from the Commission].
49. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 14, art. 86.
50. Suiker Unic UA v. Commission, 1975 E.C.R. 1663, 1666.
51. Communication from the Commission, supra note 48.
52. FCC Adopts New Rules on Foreign Carrier Entry into U.S. Markets, Report No. DC
95-137, LB Docket No. 95-22 (Nov. 28, 1995) available at 1995 WL 702273[hereinafter FCC
Adopts New Rules].
53. Id. The FCC wanted to make sure the competition level in the United States was
protected so that new investors, new companies, and new ideas could flow freely and to
encourage technological advances. Id. Only through the competitive nature of the system
would the United States Telecommunication services remain at their top level. Id.
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to prevent anti-competitive conductfs4 The third goal was to "encourage
foreign governments to open their telecommunications markets to U.S.
companies." 15
To support these goals, the ECO Test used four factors to determine
whether or not a foreign market was open to the U.S. companies. 6 If the
foreign applicant's market were closed to the U.S., then the foreign
applicant would not be accepted into the U.S. market.57 The first of the
four factors focuses on the foreign applicant's legal market barriers to
foreign entities (i.e., the U.S.) entering their market.5 The second factor
determines whether or not interconnection is allowed under "reasonable
and non-discriminatory charges, term and conditions." " The third factor
looks at competitive safeguards within the foreign system to help protect
foreign interests.60 The last part of the test looks at whether or not the
foreign country has a regulator to protect those competitive interests and
the competitor.6'
By creating the ECO Test based on some authority the FCC argues it
has over foreign companies, the FCC is creating the ability to control
international competition reforms.62 The FCC63 founds its authority for its
54. Id. The anti-competitive conduct was a deterrence to the technological advances
needed to keep American ahead and closely relates to the first goal of the ECO Test. Id.
55. Id. The American markets were quite competitive and the advances made by
American companies were continuously improving. Id. However, American companies
needed to be allowed to expand into other markets if the United States it to allow foreign
competitors into American markets. Id.
56. Id. This ECO Test applies to those foreign investors who are attempting to acquire a
controlling interest or more than twenty-five percent controlling interest in a U,S, carrier,
This test also does not apply to broadcasters, only carriers. Id. An interesting caveat is that
the test does not apply to those who only want a co-marketing agreement that has no
exchange of property or money with the foreign entity. Id.
57. Id. If no foreign ownership was allowed in the applicant's country, then the
application was denied. Id.
58. FCC Adopts New Rules, supra note 52. If the barriers were unreasonable, an
applicant would be denied. Id. For example, if a foreign company had to reapply every
year and pay a high application fee, then the FCC might see this as an unreasonable barrier
and deny the application. Id.
59. Id. Although a competitor is allowed into the foreign applicant's market that does not
mean that the opportunity is reasonable and fair. If the opportunity was fair and allowed
for good terms, then the market was deemed to be open. Id.
60. Id. If a market was open, the country should have safeguards to protect foreigners and
their investments. id. This good faith indicated that the country did want to encourage
foreign investment rather than just allowing foreigners in to satisfy some requirement. ld.
61. Id. If a country has safeguards, then the fact that the country actually relies on them is
a higher level of good faith satisfaction. Id.
62. Market Entry, supra note 2.
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discretion in Section I of the 1934 Communications Act, which had given it
the ability to create a "rapid, efficient, Nation-wide and world-wide wire
and radio communications service with adequate facilities at reasonably
charges." 64 The FCC also relies on Section 2 of the 1934 Communications
Act for foundation for its authority that covers all interstate and foreign
communication, which originates or is received outside of the United
61States. Section 3 limits the FCC's authority to the communication or
transmission by defining "foreign communication" as "communication or
transmission from or to any place in the United States to or from a foreign
country, or between a station in the United States and a mobile station
located outside the United States." 66
By creating the ECO Test, the FCC is dealing more with commerce
and investment rather than communication. 6' The FCC stated that its goal
of anti-competitive conduct and its goal of encouraging foreign markets to
open to American companies supports its authority to create and use the
ECO Test under Section 214 of the 1934 Communications Acti8 The
FCC, in hopes of establishing some connection, however tenuous on any
part of the Communications Act of 1934, attempts to draw support for its
blatant declaration of authority.
The FCC has eliminated the ECO Test during its consideration of
foreign applicants who are WTO members. 69 Now, the FCC has gone back
63. The FCC was created for the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign communica-
tion by wire and radio. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
64. Market Entry, supra note 2.
65. 47 U.S.C. § 152 (1994).
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to all interstate and foreign
communication by wire or radio and all interstate and foreign transmis-
sion of energy by radio, which originates and/or is received within the
United States, and to all persons engaged within the United States in such
communication or such transmission of energy by radio, and to the licens-
ing and regulating of all radio stations as hereinafter provided; but it shall
not apply to persons engaged in wire or radio communication or transmis-
sion in the Canal Zone, or to wire or radio communication or transmission
wholly within the Canal Zone. The provisions of this chapter shall apply
with respect to cable service, to all persons engaged within the United
States in providing such service, and to the facilities of cable operators
which relate to such service, as provided in subchapter V-A of this chap-
ter. id.
66. Id.
67. FCC Adopts New Rules, supra note 52.
68. Market Entry, supra note 2.
69. See In re Rules and Policies, supra note 8. Those members of the WTO who are
Fourth Protocol signatories are allowed in under MFN status. Id.
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to the drawing boards, creating the Open Entry Standard in order to
comply with the WTO agreement. 0 This new standard does not require
that the foreign participant come from a country who has a high degree of
commitment to the WTO pact, rather, they simply must be a member of a
WTO member nation.7
Because of the Open Entry Standard, the FCC felt the need for com-
71petitive safeguards that will be activated through very specific conduct on
the part of an authorized foreign participant.73 After the applicant gets
through the Open Entry door, the FCC focuses on the public convenience
and necessity of the entity,74 and whether that entity's participation in the
American market will affect "national security, law enforcement, or
obligations arising from international agreements to which the United
States is a party., 75
VI. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS SPANNING BATTLE LINES
Both the EU and the U.S. attempt to liberalize their markets to allow
for more competition in this global system. The WTO's Fourth Protocol
has helped tremendously and each signatory has begun to implement the
agreement in some way. Some members of the WTO agreement have not
70. Id. The FCC rules and policies notes the benefits the Americans will receive because
the WTO has opened up the telecommunications industry to provide for competition
within more markets. Id. Throughout the report, the FCC continues to claim that the
elimination of the test will lessen the burden on foreign applicant applying to the U.S. for
there is tess regulation and a reduction in time and expense since the test has been
eliminated. Id.
71. Id. By not requiring any specific level of commitment, the FCC hopes the U.S. will
lead the way to opening up telecommunication markets by strictly following the Fourth
Protocol. See id. There is a great amount of international pressure on all WTO members
to open their markets to all telecommunication competition from WTO members. Id. In
this report, the FCC realizes that if the U.S. treats each WTO member differently because
of their individual commitments to the Fourth Protocol, then the purpose of opening
markets to all will be greatly undermined. Id. The FCC feels that by repealing the ECO
Test as used on WTO members, the U.S. markets will be opened to all members. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The FCC believes that through the safeguards behavior such as price discrimina-
tion and price squeezes will be greatly deterred. See id. But these requirements will only
be in effect when that foreign entity has entered the American market. Id. Despite the fact
that the ECO test has been removed, the FCC still has to give authorization to a foreign
participant before that entity is allowed to engage in the U.S. telccommunications market.
Id.
74. See 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1994).
75. See In re Rules and Policies, supra note 8.
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committed to fully opening their markets as of yet" while others are
currently phasing in their agreements.7"
Both the policies of the U.S. and the EU are trying to ensure greater
access for their respective country's companies while improving services
for their individual citizens. This internationalization of markets will mean
faster networks, better service, lower prices," as well as a wider choice of
suppliers, products and services." Because of the WTO's Fourth Protocol,
the opening of markets means increased competition. Larger telecommu-
nication companies will be seeking to forge alliances in order to venture
out into the new markets yet being able to maintain its stronghold within
its home market.' ° Global agreements will become especially important
when dealing with clients and their needs. Clients will want to deal with
one company that can service all of their needs, rather than hassling with
many companies."' Alliances are not only becoming strategic but they are
82becoming a necessity.
76. Id. The report does cite some concerns that some members of the WTO have not fully
committed to the agreement. The Rules and Policies identify ten WTO members who will
follow the Fourth Protocol in part or at a future date. Id.
77. Id. The Rules and Policies cite a WTO Telecom Release, which reports that twenty-
five governments will be implementing the commitments stated in the Fourth Protocol.
This represents only forty percent of the WTO Members. Id.
78. See Semiconductor Industry, CREDIT SUISSE WORLD INDUS. REP., Aug. 1, 1996, at 2.
"There is only one remedy for declining prices the creation of added value and new
services. In this context, many telecoms operators are targeting the market for
multinational companies. Subscribers are to be offered more than just a telephone
service." Id.
79. See Alan Cane & David Owen, A Clear Line to Europe, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1996. See
also Chris Boam, Comment, Giving the Phoenix Wings: The Deutsche Telekorn/France
Telecom/Sprint Alliance, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 73 (1997).
80. See Telecommunications, supra note 78. "The big telecoms operators are encounter-
ing stiffer competition on their domestic markets in particular. They are having to defend
their traditional market while also being forced to expand abroad to bolster their earnings."
Id.
81. See SAI'ID MOSTESHAR, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULA-
TION 50 (1993). See also Boam, supra note 79.
82. See Alan Cane, Era of The Supercarrier, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1996, at 17.
International corporations are realizing the benefits of the technology at hand and are
beginning to require worldwide availability of the services provided so that all of their
branches and affiliates may have a uniform network functioning, flexible options such as
billing and billing breakdown, and the ability to monitor the service and its traffic. See also
Boam, supra note 79.
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VII. INTERNATIONAL RULES FOR THE CONDUCT OF
TELECOMMUNICATION WAR
The passage of the Fourth Protocol has opened markets to allow
international companies to zone in on other foreign markets in order to
preserve their ability to compete. Not seeking international partnerships
or just being an incumbent service provider can greatly deprive a company
of its market share.s3 In the past decade, the world has seen the an-
nouncement of many international mergers, such as Global One84 and the
possible merger with AT&T and British Telecommunications (BT). 5 The
need for an international framework for the telecommunications industry
is needed more now than ever before. The FCC's ECO Test is outdated.
The WTO has formed a foundation for authority, and all that is needed is
for the WTO to take one more step and form a committee that will govern
telecommunications agreements. An international committee would
further support principles and goals already set forth in the WTO
agreements.
VIII. FIGHTING THE TELECOMMUNICATION WAR ON TWO FRONTS
The WTO agreement is significant for many reasons: decrease in
rates,86 increase in telecommunication service suppliers, and it allows for
more international mergers, partnerships, and other agreements. In 1994,
Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom announced that they were to form
83. See Cane, supra note 82. See also Boam, supra note 79.
84. Fran Littlewood, Business: Telecom Giants Take Over World, THE EUROPEAN, Aug. 3,
1998, at 1.
85. Id.
86. See In re Rules and Policies, supra note 8. The FCC believes that the agreement will
help eliminate monopolies thus allowing resale, enhance competition, and just allow the
supply-and-demand theory to take over and begin to regulate the rates in the market.
87. See Fourth Protocol, supra note 5. Through the elimination of monopolies, the
markets will open up thus allowing foreign investment to come into areas, which it was
previously denied. Id. New suppliers will come into the market and build systems that are
up-to-date requiring a company to supply the actual equipment. Id. Incumbent service
providers will need to keep up thus needing equipment to replenish their own systems and
keep current. Id. Foreign investors will be attracted to the booming telecommunications
areas, especially in developing countries. Id. Overall, investors will begin to provide
capitol to those service providers, who are either updating their systems or creating whole
new systems who will in turn pay for the equipment supplied by yet another kind of
telecommunications supplier (namely the equipment providers). Id. The flow of capitol
will help create new jobs and allow the economies to strengthen and grow. Id.
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an alliance and thus notified the European CommissionY. Deutsche
Telekom and France Telecom announced that they would buy 20% of
Sprint, thus including an American company in this joint venture, which
was to be called Global One.89 The companies planned a three-pronged
attack: businesses, common carriers, and consumer services would be
tackled.9 Global One eventually received both FCC9' and European
Commission 92 approval for its venture and went ahead with its agreement.
This agreement received approval before the WTO agreement was agreed
upon, thus the old school of market analysis applied.
The major obstacle to the Global One agreement was the liberaliza-
tion of both markets.93 However, with the creation of the Fourth Protocol
and the calling for the liberalization of all signatories' telecommunications
markets, this obstacle has virtually been eliminated. 94 Previous analyses of
the international mergers have concerned themselves with the ability to
enter foreign markets and the monopolistic nature of government-owned
telecommunications providers within the EU.95 The adoption of the
88. Boam, supra note 79, at 84.
89. Id. at 85-90.
90. Id. at 85.
91. Sprint Corp. Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section 310 (b)(4) and (d)
and the Public Interest Requirements of the Communications Act of 1934, 11 F.C.C.
Record 1,850 (Dec. 15, 1995) (amend.) [hereinafter Sprint Corp.]. On December 15, 1995,
the FCC ruled that the investments of DT and FT did not need prior approval. Id. at 1855-
57. Plus, Germany and France did agree to a timetable that would liberalize their
monopolistic nature in their respective home markets allowing room for competition in
their markets. Id. at 1860-61. The FCC restricted Sprint from conducting any new
international circuits until this liberalization was complete and would not be allowed to
receive any special privileges from DT or FT. Id. at 1868-69. The FCC required Sprint to
file reports keeping the FCC informed of the status of the German and French markets so
that the FCC would know the liberalization developments in those markets. Id. at 1871-72.
92. Commission Decision of 17 July 1996 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 85 of
the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case No. IV/35.337-Atlas), 1996 O.J.
(L 239) 23 [hereinafter July Commission Decision]. The European Commission gave it
final approval on July 17, 1996. Id. The opinion called for a non-discriminatory access and
interconnection to any third party competitor. Id. The Commission had given Atlas
exemption under Article 85(3) but the approval for only for five years. Id. After this, the
Commission would review the status to see if any anti-competitive effects could be seen.
Id. Two phases required that Atlas/Global One would not offer any value-added service
until Germany and France had granted two alternative telecom infrastructure licenses and
the second phase allowed GT and FT to unite Atlas into their public switched data network
but only if the respective markets were fully liberalized. Id. See also Boam, supra note 79.
93. See Sprint Corp., supra note 91.
94. See Fourth Protocol, supra note 5.
95. See Boam, supra note 79; See also Sprint Corp., supra note 91. Both of these point to
the traditional ECO Test structure for analyzing the agreements for potential authorization
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WTO's Fourth Protocol requires the signatories to comply with a variety
of regulatory requirements, namely: prevention of anti-competitive
practices, 96 standard interconnection terms,97 unburdensome universal
service, 98 public licensing criteria,99 and a regulatory body.l°° Thus, had the
WTO agreement existed at the time of the Global One venture, the FCC
would have given its approval with far less restrictions. 1
On July 26, 1998, AT&T 12 and BT announced they will be creating a$10 billion global venture'03 The joint venture will not only combine the
of the agreement. Id. Antitrust issues are important as well; however, the FCC was very
concerned with the ability for American companies to compete in the international markets
and their decision was partly based on whether or not the American company, through the
agreement with its EU counterpart, would give that specific American company special
concessions. See Boam, supra note 79. If this was so, then other American telecommunica-
tions competitors would be at a great disadvantage essentially not allowing them to
compete giving Sprint (through Global One) a monopoly for an American company
performing international connections. Id. The European Commission was also greatly
concerned with the liberalization of the markets because of the effect this international
agreement would have on the other European Union telecommunication providers. See
July Commission Decision, supra note 92.
96. See Fourth Protocol, supra note 5. Each signatory must take active measures to insure
that major suppliers will not engage in anticompetitive practices such as the withholding of
technical information necessary to providing telecommunication services. Id.
97. Id. Signatories must provide the ability for foreign suppliers to connect to the public
switch networks. Id. Under this agreement, the Member States must do so in a timely
fashion, under nondiscriminatory terms, at cost-oriented rates, and at any of the technically
available points in the system. Id. The procedures for accessing the public network must be
made public as well as any agreements for major suppliers. Id.
98. See id. Each signatory has the right to define the universal service it wishes to
maintain but those obligations must not be more burdensome than necessary to achieve the
universal service goals.
99. Id. All of the licensing criteria that are necessary for the member's telecommunica-
tion network must be made public as well as any terms and conditions that are used to grant
licenses. Id. Any denial of licenses must be accompanied by a reason. Id.
100. id. The regulatory body must be separate from any major supplier and must be
impartial. Id. Before the liberalization of the EU Member States' telecommunications
services providers, many EU members had a national monopoly that not only provided the
services but also regulated prices and quality. Green Paper, supra note 33. The European
Commission realized how detrimental this was to the individual EU economies and called
for the separation of service providers and regulatory bodies. Id. The WTO must have
been influenced by this phenomenon. See Fourth Protocol, supra note 5.
101. See Sprint Corp., supra note 91.
102. The European Commission Green Paper on the Liberalisation of Telecommunica-
tions, Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks: Part I1-a Common Approach to the
Provision of Infrastructure for Telecommunications in the European Community, COM
(94) 682 [hereinafter Green Paper Part II]. It should be noted that the divestiture of AT&T
was a major catalyst in the European telecommunications industry. Id. Part II of the
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assets of each company but also allow the fusing of operations, such as use
of their international networks, international products, and international
traffic.'0 4 The mere announcement of the merger neither guarantees its
success nor its acceptance. 05  Three governmental bodies will have to
approve the merger: Oftel,' °6 the European Commission,' °' and the FCC.O
European Commission Green Paper on the Liberalisation of Telecommunications,
Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks (a Common Approach to the Provision of
Infrastructure for Telecommunications in the European Community) points to the
Modified Final Judgment (where AT&T had agreed to dispose of the local telephone
companies) and realized how this would bring a new energetic spirit to the United States
telecommunication industry. Id. The proposals of the Green Paper hoped to learn from
the break-up up the AT&T and the Bell companies and influence the European Union
policies. id. A renewed spirit of competition would allow other companies to provide
services within the individual Member States thus bringing about a reduction in costs to the
consumer as well the increase in need for technological updating. Id. The governmental
monopolies provide the service as well as set the rates. Id. These agencies control the
entire process allowing an unfair advantage at the expense of the consumer. Green Paper
Part II at 682. Because of this complete control, the companies felt no need to keep up
with the technological advances that have been put reached in the past few years. Id.
Because competition will force companies to vie for consumers, they will contend for the
best products and services to gain that extra edge. Id. This, the Green Paper argues, will
eventually allow the European Union to become more current and eventually progress to
the forefront of telecommunication advances. Green Paper, supra note 33.
103. AT & T News Release, AT& T, BTto Form $10B Global Venture to Serve Customers
Around the World, at http://www.att.com/press/0798/980726.cha.htm (last visited Sept. 12,
1998).
104. Id. A major goal of the venture is to allow international customers to use one
company to service all of their needs through the joining of the companies. See id. Because
customers will be able to use one company to service their needs, rather than several, the
customers will be benefiting from less hassle and will be happier with their service
providers. See id.
105. Fran Littlewood, Business: BT/AT& T: Now For the Regulators, THE EUROPEAN, Aug.
3, 1998, at 5.
106. Id. Oftel is the telecommunication regulator in Britain. Id. After the announcement
of the planned merger, Oftel held some preliminary meetings with both British Telecom
and AT&T over the specifics of the venture. Id. Oftel serves only to look at the impact on
the British consumer and should not be confused with any European Union regulatory
body. Id.
107. See generally Maastricht Treaty, supra note 14. The European Commission, under the
European Economic Community Treaty, has the authority to look into potential violation
of the EU's anticompetitive law. Id. Once it receives official notification of any possible
mergers, the European Commission will specify a time period for which other parties will
be able to object to the merger. Id. After the time period passes, the Commission will
consider those objections in conjunction with its own study of the market positions for each
company and then render a decision either approving or rejecting the merger. Littlewood,
supra note 84.
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Learning from the mistakes of its predecessor, Global One, the new
AT&T and BT alliance has begun to woo those governmental bodies"9 and
take advantage of the current phase of international law and agreements.
The WTO agreement enhances the AT&T and BT venture because each
market is deemed open; therefore the FCC will not apply the ECO Test
and the relevant market (for competition analysis) expands to include the
whole international system.
IX. CREATING A PEACEFUL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS WAR
When companies take on a global joint venture, the agreement must
meet the scrutiny of each company's home country's domestic laws and
requirements. "0 In the telecommunications industry, this can become
quite messy because individual investigations and analysis must take place
in order for this joint venture to have the proper authority."' This process
108. 47 U.S.C. § 152. Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Communications Act of 1934,
the Communications Act of 1996, and the Foreign Entry Order of 1997, the FCC has the
power to investigate mergers for any potential monopolistic inclinations. Id. The antitrust
laws, the FCC regulations, the 1934 and 1996 Communication Acts, and state regulatory
laws govern the whole of telecommunication law in the U.S. Id. There are two structures
at work in the American telecommunication industry: the state and federal systems. id.
The FCC will have control over the interstate and foreign wire and radio communications.
Id. The states, on the other hand, have authority over intrastate structures and
communications. 47 U.S.C. § 153. If a line is used both intrastate and interstate, then both
governments have jurisdiction over that line. Id. The FCC will have jurisdiction over
regulatory and antitrust conflicts and when the federal regulation defeats a state regulation.
U.S. v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1974), This dual nature of the regulation of the
telecommunications industry has created controversies and issues; however these issues are
beyond the scope of this article.
109. Littlewood, supra note 105.
110. Id. The AT&T and BT deal will require that both the EU and US be notified of the
venture. Id. The EU must allow time for third parties to voice any objections. Id. Across
the ocean, the U.S. Department of Justice and the FCC will study the agreement and
analyze potential competition threats. Id.
111. Karel van Miert, Meet Europe's Trust Buster. European Competition Policy in a
Transatlantic Perspective, available at http://www.econstrat.org/vanmiert.htm (last visited
Nov. 11, 1998). "Because nowadays, in talking about competition policy, it's not good
enough to talk about what's happening in the European Union or in the U.S., because more
and more cases will take place having a transatlantic dimension which needs to be looked
into by several competition authorities." Id. Van Miert continues on to say that more and
more cases are requiring that competition authorities from many nations work together on
an increasing basis. Id. On June 4, 1998, an agreement was signed between American and
EU authorities that would allow one or the other to investigate competition cases. Id. In
fact, the Microsoft case is being investigated in America, rather than by both agencies. Id.
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would consume time, money, and resources of each individual group.12
Additionally, this red tape would discourage smaller companies from
forming together because of the time and cost involved."' Lastly, the
many bodies of law interacting to govern international agreements would
only serve to confuse potential joint ventures and make it more difficult to
structure a partnership, joint venture, or alliance in such a way to agree
with each body of law. To avoid confusion, wasted resources and
headaches, the WTO should take a more definitive step and propose a
treaty by which all signatories would be able to allow an international body
to govern international joint ventures. This international body would
manage the agreements, analyze potential competition threats, and
regulate acts of the international joint ventures so that any anti-
competitive behavior can be stopped and/or punished.
This agreement applies when a case appears in both groups (U.S. and EU) but the agency
where the case has its "main origin.., or is producing its main effects from the point of
view of competition," then that agency will take the case. Id. However, merger and
acquisition cases remain outside the scope of the agreement. Id. Because each nation is
under obligations by other sources, these types of cases could not be included. Id. Nations
who participate in forming the WTO international telecommunications committee would
have to legislate within the individual nation allowing for the delegation of authority to the
WTO. A simply agreement between nations would not be enough. Each nation would
have to individual legislate to give up authority.
112. Ilcne Knable Gotts and Sarah E. Strasser, Notification Rules Are Complex: Failure to
Navigate Overlapping National Rules When Negotiating a Merger May Scuttle the Deal, THE
NAT'L L. J., May 4, 1998, at C-11. "Some jurisdictions have fixed filing fees--e.g., $45,000
in the United States and, generally, $25,000 (about U.S. $17,500) in Canada-regardless of
the transaction's value. Others, such as Germany, impose fees that vary with the
transaction's size and market effects." Id. It two small companies formed an agreement,
the conglomerate would have to pay the filing fees for each country. Id. If two large
companies formed an agreement, depending on which nations they had to inform, this
conglomerate would have to pay the same amount. Id. Larger companies can better
handle the fee than smaller companies with less profit and assets. Id. Although the filing
fee may seem relatively small, these fees can add up when involved with a number of
different nations. Id.
113. Cane & Owen, supra note 79. Boam, supra note 79. Smaller carriers will have to
decide between a lost identity or being a medium fish in a small pond. In other words, the
carrier will be forced to ally itself with a major carrier who is venturing out into the
international alliance scheme and potentially losing its identity. Cane & Owen, supra note
79. Or, the carrier will be forced to focus on a much smaller market and find some way to
get into a profitable niche. Id. The combination of assets enable the merged companies to
expand operations and enter into the otherwise restricted markets. Id. Smaller companies
who choose not to merge will be greatly confined to those markets it already has a foot in.
Id. However, it is predicted that incumbent companies will lose part of their clientele
during the international alliances. Market shares will most likely fall during the transitional
periods. Id. Smaller companies will most likely have to adjust by reducing their targeted
markets and balance profit and targets. Id.
TELECOM WARS
Applying to many countries for authorization for a joint venture
consumes money, time, and resources.11 4  It is likely lawyers in each
country must be consulted in order to figure out which laws govern, how
those laws are applied, and how to structure an agreement to fit the laws. 
1 5
The committees reviewing the agreement must spend time analyzing the
venture and speculate as to how the venture will affect competition within
the market. Each committee will send back a decision to the companies
accepting, denying, or suggesting changes that if implemented will give
authorization." 6 The companies must then restructure the agreement to fit
into the committee decisions but must take into account all the commit-
tees' suggestions, 117 which would require consulting lawyers and restructur-
ing the agreement, thus driving the expenses higher. If only one body had
to be consulted, the resources, expenditures, and time would be considera-
bly less.
By allowing an international regulatory body to form, smaller compa-
nies who are unfamiliar with the international system will be given greater
access. Rather than being daunted by the overwhelming nature of a global
system, a smaller company could seek a joint venture with a small
company of another nation; both could apply to the one committee, and
114. Department of Justice, Overview-Antitrust Division, available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/art/overview/html (last visited Nov. 11, 1998). The guidance the Department of Justice
provides to the business community helps "lower the costs to business of complying with
the law by reducing uncertainty about the parameters of legal behavior. It saves money for
both business and the government by helping companies to structure and organize their
operations in accordance with the law, thus avoiding the need for expensive litigation." Id.
If the WTO took on a similar role such as guiding companies through international
agreements, the "uncertainty about the parameters of legal behavior" would be virtually
non-existent. Id.
115. Id.
116. Boam, supra note 79. The Global One agreement went through many stages before it
got full authorization. Id. The FCC restricted the alliance until the German and French
markets became more open to foreign competition. Id. After five years, the FCC would
look at the markets to see if more foreigners were allowed to enter. Id. If not, then the
FCC would no longer authorize the alliance to do business in the United States. Id. The
EU Commission was concerned that the alliance would give Duetsche Telekom and France
Telecom a dominant position within the European market. Id. DT made some concession
and sold part of its holdings in order to appease a potential blockage from the Commission.
Id.
117. Id. For example, in the Global One alliance, after the Department of Justice/FCC
considerations were handed down and then the EU Commission sent warning letters,
Global One had to go back to the drawing board. Id. Although the whole agreement was
not scrapped, the companies had to focus on what was needed to pass the standards and
requirements set forth by the two national governments. Id. Each suggestion had to be
considered and then incorporated into the agreement. Id.
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then receive authority. "8  Individually, nations want to protect their
markets and domestic corporations while still seeking out opportunities for
those same companies to engage in combat in the markets of other
countries."' By not working together, the countries are counteracting the
very competition they wish to foster.
This counterproductive behavior also serves to confuse the interna-
tional companies. Each governing body of law must be studied, and the
agreement must be drafted so as to fit within the confines of each group of
laws. It must then be sent to each country's regulatory body. The global
system, as evidenced by the quick changes in the agreements, is not
conducive to long processes for joint ventures. Joint ventures are
tentatively agreed upon, but within a few months one venture may become
permanent whereas another will only fall through. Many might argue that
because of this highly unstable system, the long process only serves to
make sure that strong and secure agreements go through. However, if an
international regulatory body did exist, the quicker analysis would allow
companies to get back to the drawing room quicker to make their
agreement stronger rather than having to wait on receiving authorization
or suggestions from all the countries. An agreement can receive
authorization from one country, suggestions for another, and a denial from
a third. This situation would not be as difficult to contend with, as
compared to a situation in which a company could get suggestions from
two different governing bodies, such as the EU and the U.S., the group of
suggestions are contradictory, and authorization depends on the imple-
mentation of the suggestions.
X. ADVANCING THE LINE: WTO'S NEXT STEPS
The telecommunications market, by its very nature, lends itself to an
international body of law. The telecommunications industry requires
international cooperation and thus will be a good baby step into interna-
tional teamwork. Since many countries will scorn the idea of handing over
118. Littlewood, supra note 105. Smaller companies might be able to vie for position
nationally but internationally they could be lost. Id. To compete on this level, it will take a
lot of capitol and assets to get involved. Id. This is a major concern for both U.S. and EU
competition analysis. Id. But if more time and money is needed to notify certain
committees, these smaller companies w ill not even try to get involved in the international
telecommunications war. Id. It is the smaller companies who need to form alliances with
other smaller companies from other countries in order to gain capitol, to get a foothold into
those other countries' markets, and to receive support to compete against the larger, more
experienced corporations. Id.
119. Green Paper, supra note 33.
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TELECOM WARS
power to an international organization, especially markets and financial
systems, the WTO might need to ease into an international competition
regulatory body. After countries agree and sign, the WTO can then form a
regulatory body to govern the agreements as well as watch for anti-
competitive behavior.
The structure of the treaty will be very delicate. The Fourth Protocol
already opened the markets of the countries. A "Reference Paper," 121
distributed by the WTO Secretariat, contained principles concentrated on
by the Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications. The group
negotiated these pro-competitive regulatory principles, and many
countries adopted them."' Establishing a regulatory body to govern
potential competition effects and possible anti-competitive behavior only
takes the WTO's principles one step further. Signatories have agreed to
open markets, many have agreed to the regulatory principles, and now all
they have to do is hand over authority to one committee, to govern and
implement that which they have already agreed to.
A committee should be formed when an international joint venture is
being attempted. This committee should be in charge of investigating the
joint venture for any anti-competitive ramifications, anti-trust violations
and other such merger and joint ventures that each nation investigates.
The members of the committee should be determined by the nationality of
120. WTO Agreement, supra note 4. One of the basic functions of the WTO is to
administer WTO agreements. Id. It also is a forum for trade negotiations. Id. In order to
make sure a market is open, the WTO needs to monitor national trade policies. Id. All
signatories are required to open markets to all other members. Id. Many signatories have
also signed on to the "Reference Paper" so not only do these members share the idea that
markets should be open, but they are share ideas on how and why to foster competition.
Id.
121. Sherman, supra note 7, at 357. The Reference Paper was not issued as a formal WTO
document but many countries did adopt the principles anyway. Id. Although the principles
are really only applicable to the former monopolies in many countries (such as those seen
in the EU), thcy can be expanded to govern those who are already in the market and those
who are trying to come in the market. Id. The principles are mainly concerned with
protecting competition so monopolies do not form and those who want to compete can. Id.
"The principles relate to anti-competitive behavior, interconnection, universal service,
transparency of licensing criteria, independence of the regulator and allocation of scare
resources." Id.
122 Id. Those countries, as of February 26, 1997, are: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brunei, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cote d' Iviore, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France, Ghana, Germany,
Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Portugal, Romania, Senegal,
Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela.
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the parties to the joint venture and then three other representatives who
are determined by the members who represent the home country of the
joint venture parties. For instance, if a U.S. telecommunication company
were to join forces with an Irish telecommunication company, both the
U.S. and Ireland would have a member on the committee. In turn, those
two members would choose three other members from the WTO. The
interests of the countries who are directly involved via corporations
formed under their laws will be involved and have the opportunity to
directly influence the determination. More objective parties will also be
involved so that an eye can still be kept on the greater international
purpose to be served.
Overall, the WTO needs to further the Fourth Protocol and the prin-
ciples in the "Reference Paper" by adopting an international regulatory
body to govern international joint ventures. This "one-stop shopping"
would end confusion, ease red tape, lessen wasted resources, and further
the goal of advancing global technology.
XI. THE WAR IS WON
The WTO's pact liberalizing the telecommunications market will
prove to be a highly intelligent move towards the furthering of a global
telecommunications system. 3 Resistance would have been futile for the
inherent nature of the system calls for international cooperation. Global
One opened the door and the AT&T/BT alliance will help alleviate some
of the country's fears that the market shall lose its competitiveness. Each
country needs to realize that major international alliances, although
greatly lowering the ability for smaller new competition to enter the
market, is necessary to allow for constant update and progress in this field.
Major capitol is needed to fund research and development as well as to
implement the new technology.124 Smaller providers will be pushed out of
the market and will not be able to compete on a global scale unless the
WTO steps in to help foster competition. Competition will still abound
and no one supercarrier will be able to snuff out all other international
competition thus creating a monopoly. An international committee is
necessary to referee the telecommunication war to provide a safe haven
for competition and the WTO is just the organization for the job.
123. Fourth Protocol, supra note 5. In its approval of the MCI-WorldCom merger, the
Chairman of the FCC, William Kennard said: "Once this merger is consummated, the
industry will once again be poised just a merger away from undue concentration." FCC
Doubts Future Long-distance Mergers, Reuters (Sept. 14, 1998), at http://www.news.com/
news/0-1005-204-333190.html.
124. Littlewood, supra note 84.
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